

Africa, the EU and R2P: Towards Pragmatic International Subsidiarity?

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Introduction

Who ever said it would be easy to apply the responsibility to protect? »Responsibility to protect« – or R2P – is not only about military intervention and the EU knows it well. However, despite its efforts in the field of prevention, the EU has not adopted a genuine R2P policy yet, but should do so to engage its key partners to become champions of this norm in the international system.

What is at stake with the implementation of R2P is the establishment of a new international norm, the acceptance of and commitment to new policy behavior aimed at avoiding mass atrocities. This is controversial and has fostered several highly politicized debates. The very fact that debates are going on, however, particularly within the framework of the UN General Assembly, is a sign that R2P is not, as too many pessimists have argued, still-born. The question is whether to consider the glass half empty or half full. Our view is that tremendous progress has already been achieved in the recognition of the norm and in concrete efforts to enhance capacities to prevent, react, and rebuild. However, R2P is to some extent the victim of its own success. It does not belong to anybody, and therefore potentially belongs to everybody. The fact that it is not located in central organizations has its faults: Anybody can use and abuse it, and it does not have officially recognized legitimate watchdogs. The UN may well work on this in the near future.

R2P has raised expectations which have scarcely been met, particularly in Darfur and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). »There is still a large gap between the normative commitments endorsed at UN meetings and the actual practice of governments faced with instances of war crimes.«¹ It has been taken over by others to expand it to broader agendas such as human security or natural disasters.

1. IPPR, »Safeguarding civilians« (2007): p. ix.

While never before have so many been speaking, writing, and debating about R2P, controversy is being nurtured due to a deep lack of information, misunderstandings or political resistance to the concept and how it handles sovereignty and non-interference.

Debates about the implementation of R2P have raised new or confirmed old practical and operational challenges that armchair theorists are still unable to resolve. Old ideas, concepts, and solutions may be reheated in an R2P fashion but all these debates are necessary to adapt them to the contemporary world and to contribute to the conceptual fine-tuning and further formalization of the R2P norm. To become fully legitimate, R2P should be included in all the preambles of constitutional and founding acts of regional and international organizations (if it does not lead to a revision of the UN Charter).² This will not take place overnight and, if it happens, it will be the result of massive and long mobilization world-wide. Some may say that the EU should not play a particular role, especially in Africa, because some of its member states have a colonial past and are therefore, according to them, not credible. This is only partly true: Some credibility and legitimacy for the EU can be found beyond colonial history and with the presence of new member states inside the EU which do not share this colonial past.³ The EU, as a normative actor, has a role to play in this constructive global campaign. It should formalize its R2P policy to promote it globally, while making clear that it will contribute to R2P implementation according to the principle of subsidiarity.⁴

R2P Is Not Only about Military Intervention

R2P is more than a concept. It is almost a »charter« or at least a multi-dimensional normative doctrine that can be used in various ways, depending on what component is primarily emphasized by its supporters or

2. Edward Luck explained that R2P will not lead to a revision of the UN Charter, »The Responsibility to Protect, Where Does the EU Stand?,« European Parliament/Madariaga Foundation event, Brussels (July 1, 2008).
3. CEFRES (Centre Français de Recherches en Sciences Sociales, Prague) seminar, »L'Union européenne élargie et le développement de l'Afrique: comment tenir les engagements du millénaire?« (March 2006), www.cefres.cz (accessed June 2007).
4. De Waal, Alex: »Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect,« in *International Affairs* (November 2007): 1039–154.

skeptics. It encompasses a wide range of responsibilities: to prevent, to react, to rebuild, to know, to inform, and to assist others to do the same.

The literature has focused on some of these dimensions, depending on the priorities identified by authors. For instance, IPPR has focused on the responsibility to react. In 2008, various debates in Europe (Wilton Park, IPI seminars and speeches by Gareth Evans) focused on military interventions, their criteria and associated misunderstandings rather than on long-term prevention and post-crime reconstruction. Debates have focused so far on the criteria for using force (in a violent or non-violent way), the nature of intervention⁵ (some focusing more on prevention, others on reaction or reconstruction), and the scope of legitimate interventions (some wanting to include natural disasters in a broad notion of »humanitarian interventions« and others insisting on the need to narrow it down to cases of mass atrocities). They will hopefully be clarified by a UN document on R2P to be expected late 2008.

The confusion between R2P and the protection of civilians occurs when R2P cases include non-man-made disasters, structural human insecurity situations, and malign/passive neglect by governments. But as the ICISS report authors underline, R2P is primarily about mass atrocities and crimes. In their view, humanitarian interventions following natural disasters are very much on the fringe of R2P (Evans 2008). Therefore, too broad or loose definitions of the responsibility to react, confused with »protection of civilians by humanitarian interventions« may endanger or jeopardize implementation of the R2P doctrine.⁶ The EU will need to develop its understanding and knowledge of R2P if it wants to follow and influence ongoing UN work on the matter. Ultimately, implementing the norm is the best way to promote it.

5. Intervention is defined by the ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) as »any action taken against a state or its leaders, without its or their consent, for purposes that are claimed to be humanitarian or protective in nature,« ICISS Report: 8, paragraph 1.38.

6. The IPPR definition, in that regard, seems too broad: »safeguarding the rights of citizens from »violence, coercion and the denial of basic subsistence«, and helping to secure this within a framework defined by international humanitarian law«; IPPR; Safeguarding civilians« (2007): 11.

Africa and R2P

With or Without R2P: Africans' Peace Challenges

Prevention remains key in Africa (Powell and Baranyi 2005: 5). According to some, over the last 15 years, the following countries have been in R2P-situations: Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, northern Uganda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and the DRC (IPPR 2007: 10). The risk of a deteriorating security situation remains highly predictable in most of these cases and is the subject of globally circulated early warning publications. R2P implementation can work in Africa because it is already supported by some African champions and organizations.

First, with its »right to intervene« the AU started to endorse R2P principles before others as early as 2000 and the articles of its Constitutive Act⁷ are seen as a »more liberal provision than anything in the UN Charter« (de Waal 2007) nurtured by grave concerns after the OAU's inability to react to mass atrocities under Idi Amin, Bokassa or the Rwandan genocide (Kioko 2003: 812). Similarly, ECOWAS did not wait for the ESDP to be created to develop its security arm: In 1990, ECOMOG was created as a mix of tools for military intervention and crisis mediation (Nivet 2006: 14).

Second, just because one must first fight political battles to prioritize prevention does not mean that it will never become a priority. Political will, in Africa and elsewhere, is usually slow and hard to get into motion and deaf to early warnings. While R2P's major strength consists of its emphasis on preventive instruments, it is like a skilful mechanic without tools. This is what skeptics, or realists, will say, but African realities tell us the opposite.

7. AU Constitutive Act, article 4(h) states that one of the principles of the AU is »the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity«. Article 4(j), added in 2003, declares »the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.« The scope of this provision remains unclear and is subject to debate among experts. Cf. Kioko (2003: 816, note 20). Tim Murithi also mentions Article 7(e) of the Protocol of the Peace and Security Council (Murithi 2007). Although there is a contradiction with the principle [4(g)] of »non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another,« and therefore the prevalence of one over the other needs to be substantiated and debated among member states, Murithi sees the AU language as a »major qualitative difference,« African Union (2000): http://www.africa-union.org/About_AU/AbConstitutive_Act.htm, accessed September 10, 2008.

Indeed, Africans have not waited for the renewed R2P debate or the creation of a European defense policy to act successfully and apply R2P principles: for instance, in Burundi with AMIB (Murithi 2007: 18–19). The AU has mediation mechanisms, which work more or less well, but they are there, including the AU Peace and Security Council and the AU Panel of the Wise. RECS also have mediation bodies, such as ECOWAS or IGAD. The AU has an embryonic sanctions policy (African Union 2000: Art. 23).

Ultimately, it would be unfair to accuse the R2P approach without recognizing that what underpins the absence of collective political will to intervene (in Africa or elsewhere) is the weakness of transparent and co-ordinated governance, be it in foreign or domestic policy. For instance, in the case of Darfur, Alex de Waal speaks of Sudan's »internally dysfunctional regime facing a confused and inconsistent international community« (de Waal 2007: 1053). R2P is probably more easily applicable in contexts where decision-makers are more subject to political and economic pressures. Leaders of oil-rich countries, for instance, are always more difficult to convince since the carrots they can be offered are usually not attractive enough to them and the sticks are not substantial enough to be really threatening. Political will may also emerge where it is not expected or welcomed by Europeans and Americans; for instance, African governments manage to find it during trade negotiations when they have to defend their economies and their agriculture to prevent further food crises and debts.

Even if the AU reaches a consensus on intervention in an R2P case, disagreement on the form it should take is always possible. One productive and fertile avenue for improvement is the long-awaited coordination between the AU and RECS. More generally, African peacekeeping or early action capacities are overstretched and it will take time before the African Standby Force is fully operational, despite, by »African standards,« rapid development (SEF 2008: 2; Cilliers 2008). This is not new or specifically related to the R2P doctrine: International peacekeeping and policing have been suffering from a »capability-expectations gap« for almost two decades, as pointed out officially by the Brahimi report.

De Waal has demonstrated, on the basis of technical and practical examples, how the international community failed to apply R2P efficiently in Darfur (de Waal 2007). However, he does not challenge the concept of R2P *per se*. While his operational points are correct, his conceptual conclusion is wrong. Tensions between political priorities and technical

advice that developed during the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) negotiations inside the AU and the UN were caused less by the R2P doctrine as such than by its short-sighted and naïve application and advocacy. As he rightly underlines, »security for Darfurians remains poor« because of »multiple conflicts and lawlessness, the lack of an agreed and workable peace agreement« mainly due to »the perfidy and ruthlessness of the Sudan government, and the incompetence and vanity of the leadership of the armed movements.« This has little to do with what he points to as »inadequate conceptualization of the R2P« or if it does, some more detailed argumentation would be welcome.

While R2P champions will work hard – and sometimes involuntarily badly – to promote it, spoilers will continue to be active too. US policy and advocacy have already played a counter-productive role in the case of Darfur. The Afghan and Iraq wars created deeply rooted fears among Arab and African diplomatic circles that any US-supported intervention in Sudan would lead to a de facto invasion and human disaster (de Waal 2007: 1046; BBC 2008). In Africa, R2P will also probably continue to be misused or abused. In 2006 the SLM and JEM themselves used the R2P argument, and particularly the protection of civilians by the international community, as a precondition for pursuing the DPA talks (de Waal 2007: 1052). Militarization of African states for the sake of R2P may also turn out to be a double-edged sword if military forces are not kept under control and monitored democratically (Powell and Baranyi 2005). However, the well founded worry concerning abuse raised by some authors (Saxer 2008: 4) is not likely to be realized if those deciding to intervene carry out solid conflict analyses and risk assessments. Finally, some worry that if not well implemented, R2P in Africa risks being gender-blind and missing its targets (Powell and Baranyi 2005).

Tensions will remain between R2P champions and those rulers relying on elite solidarity between authoritarian regimes. However, it is not guaranteed that R2P will not win out. African R2P promoters are speaking out, most recently in relation to Kenya and Zimbabwe (Botswana, Kenya PM, Senegal, Tanzania). These alliances and solidarities may also change over time and a critical mass may achieve a lot during a certain period before becoming weakened and bypassed by a more conservative group of leaders.

African Views and Positions on R2P: In Words and in Practice

African Words on R2P: Who Said What?

Coalition building and advocacy concerning R2P are affecting Africa's leaders and civil society by shaping the policy agenda. This is happening alongside a »tactically inspired constructivist approach: to sponsor the emergence of a moral norm or a legal frame that has the potential to grow into international customary law« (Saxer 2008: 3). The advocacy letter asking heads of diplomatic missions to the UN to promote R2P during the UN General Assembly in September 2008 was signed by an impressive number of African NGOs and think tanks (even though their political affiliations should be analyzed more closely). R2P has been supported from the very beginning by some African champions, Kofi Annan being the most prominent. Amongst African states, South Africa and Rwanda were mentioned as the most active in the 2005 UN General Assembly in incorporating R2P language. It remains to be seen how African representatives will behave in 2008. The outcome of the UNGA will confirm whether R2P has raised »false expectations« among Africans, discredited the UN system even further, and strengthened the perception of double standards. It will also clarify whether R2P is considered »less intrusive« by Africans than »human security« or »humanitarian interventions« (Saxer 2008: 5).

African authors have been very supportive of R2P, however. Ben Kioko, a legal adviser to the AU, considers the ICISS criteria for deciding on intervention as an acceptable option for the AU (Kioko 2003: 818). However, he stresses that intervening in one failed state could create a precedent difficult to replicate in all cases, because of a lack of capacities in the AU. He hopes that appropriate use of sanctions by the AU will avoid its engaging in »costly interventions.« Tiyanjana Maluwa, a famous South African lawyer and former OAU legal officer, has also supported the »right to intervene« (Kioko 2003: 820). Tim Murithi has written that »R2P (...) should be the blueprint for securing Africa's future and the stability and prosperity of the continent's citizens« (Murithi 2007: 18).

African R2P Practice: Lessons Learned from the Sudan Case by Alex de Waal

This article does not seek to analyze the performance of various peace-keeping missions in Africa. It may, however, be useful to select practical examples from the Sudan case illustrating an African commitment to R2P

in practice and its main shortcomings. Darfur illustrated how the responsibility to react failed because of (mainly US-based) unrealistic advocacy efforts focusing primarily on the (desperately insufficient) deployment of protection troops and how this focus on troop deployment undermined attempts to achieve a genuine peace deal (de Waal 2007: 1045).⁸ To some extent, the Darfur crisis has shed light once again on possible contradictions between the short-term timing of emergency physical protection by armed forces and the slower pace of political negotiations on the DPA, as it became impossible to find an international consensus on the assumption that the »last resort« threshold had been crossed long ago. Alex de Waal's analysis of the DPA negotiation process on a cease fire, disarmament and civilian protection also highlighted major shortcomings, attributed to incompetence, lack of strategic planning, and political and security misreading by key UN, AU, and Western diplomats.⁹ Worst case scenarios have been realized for the hybrid AU-UN UNAMID or AMIS missions, with serious fatalities. As de Waal declares, »AMIS achieved much in its first twelve months (...).« However, all the »promises by the AU and the international donors« regarding the mandate, »a more realistic concept of operations, larger numbers and better logistics« were »not delivered« (de Waal 2007: 1041).

EU Prevention Efforts: Are Good Intentions Enough?

A lot has been written on EU prevention policies and this article does not plan to provide an additional overview of this field (European Commission, Crisis Management Initiative 2006 and Braud 2006). The economic

8. It should also be noted that the NGO community split because of divergences regarding the advocacy strategy to be adopted on Darfur. To mention only Crisis Group, it is not by chance that John Prendergarst left the organization to dedicate himself exclusively to the Enough project, after having raised dissatisfaction inside Crisis Group. Enough was then joined by several Crisis Group American junior staff members of Crisis Groups.
9. »The greatest frustration of the AU mediation team's security advisers and the senior DPKO staff assigned to the Darfur file is that their professional advice has been consistently brushed aside by political concerns.« »The AU's security advisers argued for a longer process of capacity-building and confidence-building among the commanders in the field, and when that was rejected, for a longer time to develop the basic concepts for advancing security in Darfur and obtaining the agreement of the parties« (de Waal 2007: 1049 and 105).

and social root causes of conflicts and mass violence need to be addressed by long-term prevention policies through harmonious development strategies. The EU has already tried to do a lot but could do much better by improving the quality of its aid in accordance with people's needs.

As for R2P, most of the online literature on the subject, produced by African and European think tanks, has been funded by European states.¹⁰ It is already well known that the EU has supported various African peace missions through its Africa Peace Facility but also within the framework of special relationships with sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS. New complementarities could be found between the institutional EU and AU Early Warning System (CEWS) and private organizations and NGOs. The possibility of the EU contributing to an AU-managed African Development Fund for post-conflict reconstruction could also be envisaged (Murithi 2007: 17).¹¹ There will obviously be a need for funding peace-keeping operations, in addition to African funding, which can actually be quite substantial.¹²

More generally, when it comes to assessing the legitimacy of the EU in contributing to prevention, the issue of double standards arises. While presenting itself as a global player defending democratic values and human rights, the EU and some of its member states have invariably implemented realistic national foreign policies in Africa. This ambiguity has fuelled criticism from African leaders who are less and less willing to accept European lectures on human rights, governance, and the rule of law. In 2008, the controversy concerning Belgian-DRC relations, the election crisis in Zimbabwe, and the ICC Prosecutor's indictment of Sudan's President Bashir are the latest examples of tense relations between African leaders and European powers.

10. The South Africa-based ISS and SALLA are funded by European states. Among publications and projects quoted in this paper, the ISS African Security Review on R2P was funded by the Dutch MFA. The 2007 IPPR study on R2P »Safeguarding Civilians« was funded by Sweden and Norway. The CCR study »Africa's Responsibility to Protect« was funded by DANIDA (Denmark) and the CCR is supported by Sweden, DFID, and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.

11. The recent increase in oil prices has also been an historic opportunity for oil-rich countries to create a funding mechanism aimed at strengthening the African Peace Fund with an emphasis on crisis prevention and early action (it might be an R2P fund, or the equivalent of the UN Peacebuilding Fund).

12. Kioko (2003: 822) gives the example of Nigeria which spent 1 million US-Dollars a day in Sierra Leone. With the rise in oil prices, oil-rich countries or their elites have most probably accumulated significant sums.

In cases of serious and massive human rights violations, the EU is well equipped to protect people. While R2P promoters acknowledge that the EU has done pretty well in developing its prevention/reaction/reconstruction tool box, they recently emphasized the need for a more sophisticated EU approach to sanctions (Human Rights Watch and OXFAM France-Agir Ici 2008).

The IPPR, in its report »Safeguarding Civilians,« recommends the appointment of a UN SG senior adviser on sanctions and the development of expertise in the field of sanctions. Other efforts could be directed towards supporting UN mediation work. For example, the IPPR recommends doubling the UNDPA budget (IPPR 2007).

EU Support for Africa's Responsibility to React

Within the framework of the Africa–EU partnership, the EU is committed to supporting the African Peace and Security Architecture as the main step towards strengthening Africa's crisis response tool. An action plan was agreed in 2007 and its implementation, although slower than expected, is ongoing. General Pierre Michel Joana has been appointed as Special Adviser for African peacekeeping capabilities.

The difficulty of implementing R2P with African regional organizations and the AU is that, for a variety of reasons analyzed above, they are probably not cohesive enough to act as solid partners. In the case of ECOWAS, Bastien Nivet mentions the lack of European financial resources and political will to finance African peacekeeping forces (Nivet 2006: 25). The absence of a formal relationship between the AU and the RECs has also been stressed repeatedly and long-awaited protocols have taken ages to be signed. This has hampered the effectiveness of direct EU support.

EU support for ECOWAS conflict prevention policies has remained modest (cf. Nivet 2006: 24) in comparison with the amount dedicated to development aid and trade policies. The question, again, is not the amount of funds, but the quality of aid and its conflict sensitivity. The EU would certainly do better to maximize the preventive impact of its development aid and trade policies by mainstreaming conflict-sensitive approaches to its development aid, humanitarian aid, trade, and security policies (Helly 2006).

Towards an EU Doctrine to Promote R2P as a Normative Power

The EU must first do its homework on R2P. One of the main things the EU should avoid is creating expectations that cannot be met, given that, as former Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten once declared, its capacity to make policy promises is much more impressive than its capacity to deliver (Sourd 2006: 47).

It should adopt an R2P doctrine defining guidelines for action and reaction, the use of force, adequate resources, and administrative structures. The R2P doctrine should be developed on the basis of existing strategic documents and mechanisms – European Security Strategy, Göteborg program for the prevention of violent conflicts, Stability Instrument, LRRD communications – and develop guidelines beyond these policies by focusing on aspects in respect of which the EU can »add value« in the continuum of prevention–reaction–rebuilding. Since the ICISS report provides the most elaborate account of R2P, the Crisis Group has suggested that the EU could simply incorporate some of it in its strategic documents.

Regarding the European Security Strategy, Roland Sourd writes: »With this text taking, as a starting point, the EU duty to share its responsibility in ensuring world security, Subsaharan Africa seems to be the sole region, apart from its immediate neighbourhood, where the Union so far is able to play a full international security role, particularly through a global policy of conflict prevention, management and resolution.«

That being said, the principal problem – in what circumstances do we commonly accept the use of force? – remains unsolved. The general prohibition of the use of force, confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case (1949) and the case concerning »Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua« (1986) (Kioko 2003: 20, quoting Penelope C. Simons) should be studied in more depth as background work for a European doctrine on R2P, and European policymakers and lawyers should collectively seek answers to the following key questions: »What kind of abuses are we ready to react to? How narrow or broad is the reaction agenda? What do we mean by the protection of civilians?« (IPPR 2007: 19). These three questions could guide the EU in drafting an EU consensus on R2P to cross-fertilize with the work being done in the UN on the matter.

Division of Labor: Applying Subsidiarity in Africa

Subsidiarity is a matter of using the most appropriate level of action to achieve policy goals (Sinnot 1994).¹³ In its negative dimension it implies that the Community should not intervene if member states' policies are satisfactory. Its positive dimension means that it should act when state policies are unable to provide satisfactory results.

In Africa, subsidiarity could be applied among African organizations and institutions based on the relevance of the respective levels of action, be they local, national, sub-regional, or regional. This could help to overcome a number of problems, such as intra-regional competition, political division, and territorial disputes. African security or mass violence issues, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, have regularly been internationalized and dealt with by various levels of governance. Very often, crisis responses have involved a mix of African and international organizations, states, and institutions.

Beyond Africa, subsidiarity could also be applied in the case of the EU–Africa relationship (although the EU, as a regional organization, is at the same governance level as the AU). When relevant, the EU should, as it has done so far, agree to let African organizations, states or institutions play their appropriate roles. Similarly, when it is acknowledged that African entities are not able or willing to act, the EU should be committed to supporting them. In practice, the subsidiarity principle has been applied repeatedly, but without being explicitly promoted. As Roland Sourd puts it, subsidiarity should govern the EU's external actions. This is true as long as its implementation brings additional resources and capacities (Sourd 2005: 51). While the EU may bring what member states lack, African policy-makers need to bring what the EU does not have: African political will and efficient governance. This will also have to be found in a sound balance between subsidiarity and regional hegemony, with certain states playing a leading or at least initiating role (Møller 2005: 46–48).¹⁴ Only

13. »In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can, therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.« Treaty on European Union, Article G, par. 5.

14. The author lists various models: subaltern hegemony, bigemony, shared hegemony (for instance between South Africa and Nigeria), cooperative hegemony (allegedly more suitable to a Soft Power Europe).

through this flexible triangular synergy could R2P find satisfactory implementation. The pragmatic subsidiarity principle would therefore bring added value to a future EU R2P doctrine.

However, any new division of labor involves risks. One is putting Africans in the firing line and taking the main risks, while international/Western agencies do the »cool« job. For instance, institutions such as the African Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights or the African Development Bank have a role to play (Powell and Baranyi 2005: 4). Another risk is the delusion of responsibilities in an already crowded African institutional environment. As Møller puts it, »when the available resources are scarce and there are few benefits to be gained from becoming involved in conflicts such as that in Darfur, overlapping memberships of subregional organisations may also make it all too tempting for everybody to avoid engagement by claiming that the responsibility belongs somewhere else« (Møller 2005: 46).

Conclusion: Building R2P Coalitions Worldwide

The promotion of R2P and its implementation is ongoing at the global level and new developments should be expected by the end of 2008. Whatever the outcome of the UNGA, the EU should continue its work on R2P implementation in cooperation with the AU, RECS, and African states. To do so, it will first need to make its positions on R2P more explicit through an R2P doctrine to be promoted as a global normative actor. It will then need AU coherence on R2P and the conditions under which intervention mandates are to be issued. The support of global players such as China – which declared that it would make it easier to endorse R2P principles in the UN Security Council (Saxer 2008: 7, quoting Kleine-Ahlbrandt 2008) – Russia, and the US will also be crucial to legitimize and anchor R2P in the international order.

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